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IslamIc FInance as a mechanIsm For 
BolsterIng Food securIty In the mIddle east: 
Food Security Waqf 
by Hdeel Abdelhady, Esq.*
IntroductIon
This article proposes the establishment of a multilateral food security waqf, a type of Islamic trust or endowment, as a vehicle of investment in the future food security of 
the Middle East. Sections II through IV briefly discuss global 
food insecurity, Middle East food insecurity, and the need for 
a regional food security strategy for the Middle East. Sections 
V through VIII discuss contemporary Islamic Finance generally, 
the essential objectives of Shari’ah, historical waqf practice, 
Islamic perspectives on agriculture, and the proposed food secu-
rity waqf. This article focuses on the rationale and objectives of 
waqf-based and other agricultural investment frameworks that 
are currently under development by the author, for application 
by governments, institutions, and private entities. The structures 
under development combine the waqf (as a foundational frame-
work to allocate funding and other assets) with Islamic financ-
ing structures, Islamic and conventional asset management 
approaches, Shari’ah and civil law-based legal frameworks, and 
effective governance and operational models to achieve mea-
sureable impact, in a manner that equitably and rationally dis-
tributes rights and responsibilities among parties across the food 
supply chain, from government consumers to small farmers.
While this article focuses on the use of the waqf structure to 
advance food security, its premises and objectives have broader 
application. As discussed below, the waqf structure has been 
used successfully in the past to promote public objectives, such 
as education, aid to the poor, healthcare, public access to water, 
and food aid. While the use of the waqf has declined in modern 
times, its history suggests strongly that the structure was and can 
again be a powerful vehicle through which resources are orga-
nized and allocated to advance development objectives.
I. Global Food InsecurIty: a snapshot
Food insecurity is a global threat.1 The nature of food and 
the means of its production make food insecurity a uniquely 
complex problem, with social, political, economic, and ethical 
dimensions. Serious efforts to promote food security and sus-
tainability must respond to the complexities of the challenge.
According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations (“FAO”), “in order to feed a population of 
more than 9 billion [the projected world population in 2050] and 
free the world from hunger, global food production must nearly 
double by 2050.”2 Competition for food and for the means of 
food production is increasing, without commensurate rises in 
supply.3 Owing to population growth, increased food purchasing 
power and demand in emerging economies, climate change, land 
degradation, price volatility, and other factors, the global food 
supply-demand imbalance is expected to widen.4 The world’s 
governments have taken note. Acting independently and multi-
laterally, they have devoted resources to assess the food inse-
curity threat, and have taken steps to mitigate the risk.5 As yet, 
however, no comprehensive solutions are on the horizon.
II. Food InsecurIty In the MIddle east
The Middle East is particularly susceptible to food insecu-
rity.6 While the region does not face any foreseeable near-term 
threat of famine or widespread malnutrition,7 the Middle East 
presently lacks the means to produce adequate food supplies 
due to water scarcity, insufficient arable land, and man-made 
hurdles.8 These hurdles include land and crop misallocations, 
under-utilization of food production means, inadequate invest-
ment in agriculture, poor stock management, sub-optimal distri-
bution networks, and other factors.9
According to the World Bank, as of 2008, the Middle East 
imported fifty percent of its food.10 “High food prices and inter-
national market volatility mean domestic agriculture has taken 
on strategic importance in all the food producing countries in the 
region.11 Non-food producing countries, such as member states 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”), are looking at ways 
of securing land in third party countries to produce part of their 
food needs.”12
By 2030, the combined Muslim population in the Middle 
East is expected to grow to 439,453,000.13 Today, the Muslim 
population is estimated at 321,869,000.14 This projection, a 
36.5% net increase in population in less than twenty years, is 
staggering. The consequences of such population growth for 
food security in the Middle East will be profound.
At the country level, Middle Eastern countries have 
attempted to address food insecurity risks through food subsi-
dies, export bans, price ceilings, and other policy measures, as 
well as by acquiring rights to farmland overseas.15 For instance, 
food exporting countries like Egypt, Yemen, and Djibouti 
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impose ad hoc export restrictions in response to global price 
rises.16 The governments of the Middle East, as in the cases of 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Djibouti, and Yemen, employ govern-
ment subsidies as a primary means of facilitating domestic food 
affordability.17
Arab countries, and particularly GCC states, which lack 
the arable land and water resources necessary to produce food 
sustainably, also pursued other avenues such as acquisition of 
long-term agricultural land rights overseas.18 Between 2006 and 
2009, Arab governments, government-owned companies, and 
private entities (primarily in the GCC states) were particularly 
active in acquiring agricultural land overseas.19 According to 
one compilation, forty-nine agricultural land deals and land-
related investments were initiated or concluded between 2006 
and 2009.20 Of those, twenty-one (45%) involved Arab countries 
(most by governments with limited private companies) as inves-
tors.21 The countries involved in these transactions were Saudi 
Arabia (five), the United Arab Emirates (four), Qatar (three), 
Bahrain (three), Kuwait (two), Libya (two), Jordan (one), and 
Egypt (one).22 The majority of these investments were made 
in Africa and Asia, and eleven of the twenty-one were made in 
majority Muslim countries.23 This data is illustrative, and reflects 
only a fraction of overseas agricultural land investments that are 
understood to have been made by Arab and non-Arab countries 
and private parties in recent years.24
While the logic of these land acquisitions is clear, their 
sustainability is not. Acquisitions of overseas land and land-
use rights by Arab countries and other parties have not been 
without controversy.25 These transactions are very likely to 
pose significant legal and political risks, an expectation that 
is borne out by the inhospitable reception they have received 
both inside and outside their host countries.26 They have been 
characterized as “land grabs”—modern scrambles for resources 
reminiscent of nineteenth-century colonization.27 The terms of 
these land acquisitions and their details are often, if not always, 
undisclosed.28 This opacity has fueled suspicion that the deals 
are opportunistic usurpations of scarce resources by relatively 
wealthy countries at the expense of relatively poor countries and 
their small farmers.29 The lack of transparency and controversy 
surrounding agricultural land acquisitions raises questions not 
only about their nature, but about their long-term viability as a 
means of securing food supplies.
As a practical matter, the acquisition of agricultural land to 
produce food exclusively for the benefit of acquirer countries is 
legally and politically risky. It is not difficult to envision scenar-
ios in which yields generated on overseas land would be wholly 
or partially expropriated, subjected to export bans, or otherwise 
intercepted, particularly in events of local or global food short-
age and political or social unrest. Think tanks and other organi-
zations have called for the regulation of overseas investments in 
agricultural lands.30 For example, the International Food Policy 
Research Institute has suggested that investors should refrain 
from exporting crop yields in the case of food shortage in a host 
country.31 Such concerns, and the political and legal risks asso-
ciated with overseas land acquisitions, will likely increase over 
time, as global competition for food increases, exacerbated by 
demographic and environmental strains.32
The governments and companies that invest in agricultural 
lands overseas can, and likely have, put into place agreements 
to achieve optimal commercial and legal conditions. But under 
extraordinary circumstances, these agreements will be insuffi-
cient to overcome the very real risks stemming from political 
and social tensions that surround food, agricultural land, and the 
reality or perception of exploitation associated with overseas 
agricultural land investments. In worst-case scenarios, Arab gov-
ernments and other investors in overseas agricultural land might 
find themselves with recourse only to international tribunals and 
money damages, and without access to the very crop yields for 
which they bargained.33 Money damages would hardly be com-
pensatory in such cases, as these investments are not made for 
profit, but for specific performance—i.e., the enforcement by 
host governments of investors’ rights to produce on agricultural 
lands and repatriate agricultural yields.
More immediately, overseas land acquisitions by some Arab 
countries are detrimentally impacting the food (and water) secu-
rity of other Arab countries. For example, Arab countries includ-
ing Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, 
are believed to have acquired agricultural land or land use rights 
in the Sudan (prior to the establishment of South Sudan as an 
independent nation).34 These acquisitions (and those by non-
Arab countries and private parties) in the Sudan and other Nile 
Basin countries directly threaten Egypt’s “ability to put bread 
on the table because all of Egypt’s grain is either imported or 
produced with water from the Nile River, which flows north 
through Ethiopia and Sudan before reaching Egypt.”35 In addi-
tion to being flawed in a practical sense, these Nile River-related 
land (and water) acquisitions present risks and interesting legal 
questions, such as whether state parties to an agreement for the 
use of a common and vital resource like the Nile River may con-
tract out access to the resource to third parties for profit, to the 
detriment of other state parties to the same agreement. Indeed, 
such scenarios should prompt examinations of the nature and 
limits of relevant legal concepts, such as sovereignty over natural 
resources, particularly where a third-party state benefits from a 
shared natural resource at the expense of one or more states with 
direct and assertable rights of access.
As an important matter of national policy (if not national 
security), Arab governments must pursue food security solu-
tions that are economically, politically, socially, and ethically 
sustainable. Measures taken by Arab countries thus far fail to 
address food insecurity comprehensively or at its root. At the 
regional level, Arab governments have yet to take coordinated 
steps to combat food insecurity. This likely is a symptom of a 
more general reality, which is that Arab countries, for a variety 
of reasons, trade more with countries outside, rather than within, 
their region.
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III. The Case for a regIonal food  
seCurITy sTraTegy
“There is no way around the reality that MENA 
[Middle East and North Africa] countries will need to 
buy a significant- and increasing- share of their food on 
international markets… the key is to manage this expo-
sure in new and innovative ways to reduce the potential 
for food prices shocks without going bankrupt in the 
process.”
 —World Bank, april 200936
The quoted statement describes key challenges of food inse-
curity in the Middle East. However, the gravity of the long-term 
food insecurity threat to the region requires much more than 
management of exposure to international markets. As the global 
food supply-demand imbalance widens over time, the difficul-
ties and risks associated with food security will intensify in the 
Middle East unless effective coordinated action is taken now.
The political, social, cultural, and historical ties that bind 
Middle Eastern countries favor the pursuit of a regional food 
security strategy, as do the geographic, demographic, and eco-
nomic differences between them. As recent political uprisings 
have shown, major events in even one Arab country have the 
potential, if not the likelihood, to produce similar or follow-on 
events in others.37 The consequences of food insecurity, if it 
intensifies in the region or any of its major countries, will have 
regional impact: whether in the form of economic migration, 
spillover social and political unrest, or the need for food and 
other aid from neighboring states.38
Bolstering regional food production and supply in a coor-
dinated fashion also would serve as a defensive measure, to the 
extent that Middle Eastern countries limit the need to compete 
for food in the global marketplace. Beyond politics and market 
exposure, the Middle East, for the sake of its development, has a 
fundamental interest in creating conditions in which its inhabit-
ants live in an environment conducive to progress in all spheres.39 
Other than the related issue of access to water, no single issue 
is more essential to the creation and long-term maintenance of 
such conditions than is food security.
The GCC states, while comparatively cash rich, desperately 
lack the arable land, water resources, human resources, and depth 
of agricultural experience necessary to produce food sustain-
ably and at appreciable levels.40 By comparison, the relatively 
cash poor countries of the region, including Egypt, the Sudan, 
Algeria, Morocco, and the countries of the Levant, individually 
and together possess the agricultural land, climate conditions, 
human resources, and agricultural experience to produce food 
in appreciable quantities, and in any case at higher than pres-
ent output levels.41 But this latter group of countries has yet 
to realize its agricultural production potential for a number of 
reasons.42
As a region, the Middle East has not explored its potential 
to sustainably bolster food security by marshaling its combined 
monetary, natural, and human resources for the long-term benefit 
of its inhabitants. It is in the region’s best interest to identify 
and pursue strategies to bolster food security, through increased 
regional production and other means, in ways that are not only 
economically, legally, and environmentally sustainable, but also 
are politically, socially, and ethically sound. The food security 
waqf proposed in this article would serve as a vehicle through 
which the region’s collective resources can be allocated and 
deployed to advance sustainable regional food security.
IV. IslamIC eConomICs and fInanCe
The principles and objectives of Shari’ah, which favor 
real economic activity, profit and loss sharing (rather than risk 
remoteness), and the creation and multiplication of wealth, its 
productive use, and its allocation for the common good, are 
uniquely suited to food security and development generally.43 
As used today, Islamic modes of finance and investment have 
proven effective and attractive in the commercial realm.44 Yet in 
contemporary practice, Islamic Finance has not been used mean-
ingfully and consistently for development finance and social 
investment. As an industry and discipline, Islamic Finance has 
an interest in expanding its scope and impact, substantively and 
geographically.
Islamic Finance is a burgeoning financial services segment 
that is expected to continue to grow in volume and expand geo-
graphically.45 Current accepted estimates indicate that the size of 
the Islamic Finance industry is $1.4 trillion, with the potential to 
reach $4 trillion within five years, assuming continued growth 
at current rates.46 Regardless of its exact size or value (however 
measured), it is widely accepted that the industry has grown tre-
mendously in the past thirty years, and that demand will support 
its continued rapid growth.47
Arab jurisdictions, such as Bahrain, Dubai, and Qatar, have 
invested significantly to position themselves as centers of Islamic 
Finance.48 Saudi Arabia, which offers relatively vast domestic 
retail and commercial opportunities, through private efforts and 
more recently with government support, is in the early stages of 
building its Islamic Finance industry.49 Egypt, the most populous 
Arab country, has only recently taken steps to promote Islamic 
Finance, even though the first Islamic bank was established in 
Egypt nearly forty years ago.50 Outside of the Middle East, non-
majority Muslim jurisdictions, most notably London and Hong 
Kong, have invested political, economic, and regulatory capital 
to position themselves as global Islamic Finance hubs.51
Notwithstanding the impressive growth and burgeon-
ing popularity of Islamic Finance, common perceptions of its 
essence are limited, due in no small part to the fact that Islamic 
Finance is often framed in the one-dimensional, negative terms 
of what it prohibits—e.g., riba (a broad concept often described 
as interest)—and not in terms of what it permits and encourages, 
which broadly is the creation and multiplication of wealth, its 
productive use, and its allocation and distribution for the public 
interest.
The Islamic Finance industry, its stakeholders and propo-
nents (including governments) have an interest in demonstrat-
ing the potential real economy impact of Islamic Finance. The 
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development and social finance spheres, the objectives of which 
are compatible with Shari’ah objectives, provide a platform for 
such a demonstration.52 Further, governments that have invested 
in Islamic Finance have an interest in its promotion beyond their 
borders and the commercial spaces that contemporary Islamic 
Finance has thus far occupied. The association of Islamic invest-
ment and financial mechanisms with endeavors of global signifi-
cance, such as food security and development generally, would 
provide a platform for the expansion of Islamic Finance from 
a niche financial services segment to a discipline having wide 
applicability and potential impact beyond the commercial realm.
V. Promoting Ethically SuStainablE Food 
SEcurity inVEStmEnt: Maqāṣid al-Shari’ah
The need for enhanced ethics in the pursuit of food secu-
rity investment is clear. Ethics, as much as monetary, land, and 
human resources, will be essential to the long-term success 
of food security strategies, particularly those that span mul-
tiple countries.53 The infusion of and adherence to maqāṣid 
al-Shari’ah, or the goals and objectives of Islamic Law, in the 
pursuit of food security is one effective way to fill the ethics 
deficit, particularly in the Middle East.54 A brief look at the core 
objectives of Shari’ah demonstrates this.
Leading classical scholars of Fiqh (fuqaha) and uṣūl al-Fiqh 
(uṣūlliyyīn) delineated five “essential” objectives advanced by 
Islamic Law that are accorded the highest weight among the 
objectives of Islamic Law (maqāṣid al-Shari’ah).55 In order of 
importance, the five essentials are the preservation of: (1) the 
religion of Islam; (2) human life; (3) progeny; (4) the faculty 
of reason; and, (5) material wealth.56 According to modern 
scholars, these five “essential” objectives of Islamic law were 
established by Imam al Ghazali of the Shafi‘te School, and later 
adopted by classical scholars of the Malki and Hanafi Schools of 
Islamic law.57
In contextualizing the five “essentials” of maqāṣid al-
Shari’ah, classical scholar Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam’s com-
mentary is helpful. He is reported to have written that “all legal 
rulings in the areas of jurisprudence are contained within” the 
following Qur’anic verse: “Behold, God enjoins justice and the 
doing of good, and generosity towards [one’s] fellow-men, and 
He forbids all that is shameful and that runs counter to reason, as 
well as envy; [and] He exhorts you [repeatedly] so that you might 
bear [all this] in mind.” (Qur’an 16:90).58 The point, essentially, 
is that in Islam, as enjoined by the Qur’an and illustrated by 
the Hadith and Shari’ah interpretations, service of humankind, 
consistently with Islamic law, is an act of worship.59 In other 
words, it is fundamentally Islamic—an act of “preserving the 
religion”—to utilize and protect worldly resources, includ-
ing human life, progeny, the faculty of reason, and wealth.60 
Classical scholar Sayf al-Din al Amidi, in his defense of giving 
the highest priority to the preservation of religion, offered this 
formulation:
[w]hatever is intended to preserve the root of religion 
should be given priority over all else, since [the Islamic] 
religion’s aim and ultimate outcome is the attainment 
of eternal happiness in the presence of the Lord of the 
worlds. All other objectives, including the preservation 
of human life, the faculty of reason, material wealth 
and anything else, are in the service of this overriding 
interest. As God Almighty declares, ‘I have not created 
the invisible beings and men to any end other than that 
they may [know and] worship Me.’ (Qur’an 51:56).”61
Classical scholar Ibn Abd al-Salam explained that Islamic 
law provides an equally potent summation of maqāṣid al-
Shari’ah and that Islamic legal rulings have one central purpose, 
which is to promote human well-being. Specifically, he stated:
All divine commands and prohibitions are founded 
upon the [pursuit of] benefit for human beings both in 
this world and in the next. God Himself has no need of 
anyone’s worship. He is not benefited by the obedience 
of the obedient, nor is he harmed by the disobedience 
of the disobedient.62
In other words, the promotion of human well-being is not 
only encouraged, but required. This includes the creation, pro-
tection, and deployment of wealth in the service of individuals, 
families, and society at large. Intrinsically, the objectives of 
Shari’ah, and therefore Shari’ah-compliant finance, are compat-
ible with the objectives of development finance and social invest-
ment, which, in principle, advance the well-being of mankind. 
“In the Islamic system there is no such thing as a [charitable] 
dedication ‘solely to the worship of God.”63 It is appropriate then 
that Islamic Finance, which is Shari’ah-based, be employed to 
advance the public interest.64
Vi. Food SEcurity Waqf
This article proposes the establishment of a multilateral 
food security waqf as a mechanism for investment in the future 
food security of the Middle East.65 As envisioned, the food secu-
rity waqf would serve as a vehicle for allocating and organizing 
capital and other resources for investment in agriculture and the 
financing of essential activities such as research, technological 
innovation and transfer, agricultural production capacity build-
ing, and income-generation. Importantly, the food security waqf 
envisioned would directly or indirectly facilitate much needed 
access to finance, including by small farmers, small and medium 
enterprises, and other parties across the food supply chain.
The waqf structure (rather than a conventional conduit, such 
as a fund or corporation) is proposed primarily to mitigate the 
political and legal risks (real and perceived) that tend to deter 
investment in the region, particularly on a multilateral basis and 
for regional benefit.66 Waqf assets, relative to assets associated 
with conventional investment vehicles, have enjoyed relative 
freedom from governmental interference, due both to the general 
respect accorded to awqaf and the relative vigilance of the public 
and waqf custodians against undue interference.67
Therefore, for the purposes of diminishing legal and 
political risk in the context of multilateral Middle East invest-
ment, the waqf structure (properly crafted and with strong 
legal frameworks to diminish the likelihood of government 
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interference) provides an attractive alternative to conventional 
investment modalities. Further, the waqf structure is proven as 
an effective and administratively convenient mode of investment 
and finance, particularly for large-scale projects. As discussed 
below, awqaf have been used successfully (by Muslims and non-
Muslims) to promote the public interest and facilitate investment 
throughout culturally and geographically diverse countries. The 
potential of the waqf as a modern development and investment 
tool is borne out by history and should neither be overlooked nor 
underestimated.
Agriculture: islAmic PersPective And eArly PrActice
The promotion of food security is compatible with Shari’ah 
objectives and the distribution of agricultural resources in early 
Muslim communities. Reverence for agricultural endeavor and 
ethical practices in agricultural production and distribution are 
well-documented, and a few examples from Hadith are sufficient 
to briefly make the point.68
According to a narration of Anas bin Malik, the Prophet 
Mohammed said: “There is none amongst the Muslims who 
plants a tree or sows seeds, and then a bird, or a person or an ani-
mal eats from it, but is regarded as a charitable gift from him.”69 
The Prophet Mohammed was equitable in contracting for food 
and the means of food production.70 Various ahadith indicate 
also that while the Prophet was believed to have preferred the 
giving of land outright71, he approved share-cropping provided 
that such arrangements were not speculative and yields were 
divided equitably.72
As narrated by Abdullah bin Omar: the Prophet concluded 
a contract with the people of Khaibar to utilize the land on the 
condition that half the products of fruits or vegetation would be 
their share.”73 The Prophet is also said to have prohibited specu-
lative sharecropping arrangements, such as agreements giving 
parties rights to yields from specific tracts of agricultural land 
or specific produce from sharecropped land. Rather, the Prophet 
required that parties agree to apportion the total agricultural 
produce, whether in percentages or by other measures.74 This 
approach, which diminished speculation and more equitably 
distributed risk and reward, is consistent with the principles of 
Islamic Finance, which requires risk-sharing and the avoidance 
of gharar (undue speculation).75
These ahadith illustrate two important Islamic principles: 
first, the productive cultivation of land is encouraged and 
rewarded76; and second, the equitable use and distribution of 
agricultural products and the means of their production are con-
sistent with the teachings of Islam.
BAsic elements of WAqf And consequences of 
estABlishment77
The waqf is a kind of trust or endowment through which 
assets are allocated and preserved for a designated period of 
time or in perpetuity for specified beneficiaries for charitable, 
social welfare, development, or intra-family wealth distribution 
purposes.78 Stated more succinctly, waqf is the “[bequeathing] 
of property and dedicating the fruit.”79 Analogous to the waqf 
in non-Islamic law is the Anglo-American common law trust, 
which is considered by some to be “among the most important 
creations of the [common] law of equity… [and has] for hun-
dreds of years…played a vital role in organizing transactions of 
both a personal and a commercial character.”80
The essential legal requirements for the establishment of a 
valid waqf are straightforward and well-established. The donor 
of assets (waqif) must have legal and mental capacity.81 The 
waqif must have the right to legally transfer the assets and the 
nature of the assets must not be repugnant to Shari’ah.82 The 
pledge to transfer waqf assets must be outright, without condi-
tion or contingency.83 The permissible purposes for which the 
waqf is established (e.g., charitable or interfamily wealth trans-
fer) must be clearly stated.84 The primary beneficiaries of the 
waqf (which may include the waqif) must be identified.85 A waqf 
nazir (trustee or administrator) must be designated.86 And the 
terms of the waqf, according to the majority of scholars, must be 
in writing.87
Upon a valid declaration of waqf (i.e., an informed state-
ment, freely made, of intention to commit certain assets to 
waqf), the declaration, and therefore the waqf established by 
it, becomes irrevocable.88 After establishment, a waqf enjoys 
independent legal personality under Islamic law and may, inter 
alia, enter into transactions, acquire assets, and engage in other 
activities permitted under Shari’ah and other applicable law.89
historicAl uses of WAqf
The efficacy and legal legitimacy of the waqf structure are 
well-established. Awqaf have been used as vehicles for charity, 
the promotion of social welfare, the provision of public utilities, 
the building of rural and urban infrastructure, the provision of 
education, the building and maintenance of mosques, the pro-
vision of community medical services, and to advance other 
projects of public value.90 Waqf capital has also been a source of 
commercial credit.91
An early example of waqf is the endowment of the Ruma 
Well as a public utility.92 It is reported that, upon arriving in 
Madina, the Prophet realized that the Ruma Well was one of 
the few sources of potable water for the city. “He asked: ‘[w]
ho will purchase…[the Ruma Well] [and] equally share the 
water drawn therefrom with his fellow Muslims.”93 The Ruma 
Well was purchased and bequeathed as waqf property, to pro-
vide drinking water for the people of Madina.94 The Prophet is 
said to have advised Omar Ibn al-Khattab, a companion of the 
Prophet at the time and later his second successor (the second of 
the four Rightly Guided Caliphs), to bequeath land in Khaibar 
as waqf, which he did.95 Consistent with the Prophet’s practice, 
the Companions continued to establish waqf in the public inter-
est. “Since the Prophet instructed his Companions about bequest 
and its benefits, they never stopped attending to it and putting 
their money and property into it, so much so that. . . [a]ny of the 
Prophet’s Companions who could afford it made endowments.”96
Conterminously with the spread of Islam, waqf practice 
expanded in scope, size and impact97 through the Ottoman 
period, with the volume and quality of activity diminishing after 
that point and through the present time.98 At times, awqaf were 
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used so pervasively that they “contributed towards shaping the 
economic, religious, political and social landscape of urban 
areas in the Islamic world.”99 Thousands of awqaf were in opera-
tion in the Fatimid period (909-1171).100 And in the lifetime of 
the Ottoman Empire, awqaf had grown to a “staggering size, 
amounting to about one third of the Islamic Ottoman Empire and 
a substantial part of Muslim lands elsewhere.”101
Waqf practice was dynamic. As the needs of society and 
Islamic jurisdictions changed and evolved, so did waqf prac-
tice. “[T]he extent of endowment usages along with their legal 
framework and practices . . . varied significantly throughout the 
centuries in response to the fluctuating needs of society, tak-
ing on different and distinct forms around the Islamic world, 
often assimilating local customs which frequently preceded 
the advent of Islam or were contemporaneous with it.”102 This 
is borne out by historical practice, where awqaf assets and 
purposes included revenue-generating, mixed asset awqaf,103 
revenue-generating agricultural land,104 the funding of large-
scale commercial property developments over large areas of 
land for mosque construction,105 and the bequest of real prop-
erties sited in multiple jurisdictions for the benefit of a single 
beneficiary in another jurisdiction.106 Other historical examples 
of waqf practice include provisioning for asset substitution 
(istibdal) to ensure the continuation and flexibility of awqaf,107 
the joint establishment of waqf by spouses for themselves and 
their children, the establishment of awqaf by guilds to support 
guild members’ families,108 and the establishment of multi-party 
awqaf to support Islam’s holiest places of worship and its most 
significant institutions, such as the Two Holy Mosques, Al-Aqsa 
Mosque, and Al-Azhar.109 “Awqaf cover the Islamic world, from 
monuments such as the Indian Taj Mahal to the Bosnian Mostar 
bridge . . . from the Shishli Children’s Hospital in Istanbul to the 
Zubida’s Waterway in Mecca.”110 The successful use of awqaf, 
across jurisdictions, for diverse purposes, and with various 
assets, speaks to the flexibility, stability, and appeal of the waqf 
structure.
This brief recitation of some of the historical uses and the 
dynamism of the waqf structure illustrates its significance in the 
development of Islamic jurisdictions. The waqf was so success-
ful in some jurisdictions that British colonial administrations 
“exerted huge efforts in the nineteenth and first half of the twen-
tieth century . . . to bring these assets under state control.”111 In 
hindsight, this attempt at appropriation showed how highly val-
ued these structures had become, and it reinforces the efficacy of 
the public waqf as a successful vehicle of investment and asset 
management for diverse purposes.
VII. AdAptAtIon of Waqf for food SecurIty 
InVeStment: LegAL frAmeworkS And remoVAL 
of pubLIc AdmInIStrAtIon
As discussed, the waqf structure has been used success-
fully to promote the public interest. Regional food security is 
a matter of public interest of the highest order in the Middle 
East and elsewhere. The causes of food insecurity are various 
and numerous, but the challenges are not insurmountable. With 
proper investment, resource allocation, and management, many 
of these causes can be addressed, including poor agricultural 
practices;112 water pollution and misuse;113 lack of effective 
land use planning;114 inaccessibility of finance for small farm-
ers;115 and insufficient public investment in research, develop-
ment, and technological innovation.116 The waqf structure is 
one avenue through which these challenges can be met, for 
example, through the allocation of land for specific agricultural 
purposes, the appropriation of capital and other resources for 
research, development, and technological innovation (including 
innovations for sustainable cultivation of dry lands), the educa-
tion and training of parties across the food supply chain (such 
as stock managers and small farmers), building and improving 
infrastructure to facilitate efficient delivery and storage of food 
and agricultural staples, and the provision of finance to small 
farmers based on profit and loss sharing through the Islamic 
financing modalities.117
To accommodate multilateralism and regional food security 
objectives, and to further the political stability objectives for 
which the waqf structure has specifically been proposed herein, 
any waqf–based structure should be adapted to suit the partici-
pating parties and the scale of objectives agreed by them. The 
waqf asset composition and operating framework should incor-
porate modern asset classes and best operating practices, as well 
as Shari’ah and civil law based frameworks that mitigate legal 
risk and deter government or other interference. Importantly, 
the waqf structure contemplated requires freedom from direct 
administration or management by any general awqaf authority, 
in order to promote effective waqf management and mitigate the 
real or perceived political and legal risk associated with direct 
government participation. The waqf-based structures under 
development, for example, provide for the appointment of a waqf 
nazir or waqf nuzzar (an individual, group, or entity) to admin-
ister the waqf and maximize waqf assets, subject to customized 
and clearly defined performance benchmarks and governance 
standards.118 This approach not only would diminish legal and 
political risk, but would provide the flexibility needed to appoint 
parties with the expertise necessary to effectively, efficiently, 
and profitably administer the waqf, without undue interference. 
With these and other modifications, the objectives of mitigating 
political and legal risks would be served, clearing the way for 
the pursuit of regional food security, innovatively and effectively.
VIII. concLuSIon
The utilization of the waqf structure to bolster food security 
is legally, administratively, and politically compelling. The legal 
rights and responsibilities attendant to awqaf are clear—from 
the requirements of establishment, to the relinquishment of legal 
title to waqf assets, to the role and duties of the waqf nazir, to 
the purposes of the waqf and the identity of its beneficiaries. 
Because the framework and mechanics of awqaf are established 
and have, more often than not, been respected, the administrative 
costs of awqaf, compared to other structures, are relatively low 
as a general matter.119
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The religious origins of the waqf and its treatment histori-
cally make it a comparatively safe vehicle for the investment of 
assets, particularly in the context of multi-party agricultural 
investment with significant sovereign involvement. Compared 
to other legal structures (e.g., the corporation, partnership, etc.), 
the waqf is less susceptible to political or other interference that 
might frustrate the waqf purpose or diminish the value of waqf 
assets through misappropriation or mismanagement.
Middle Eastern countries, institutions, and private parties 
would serve the food security needs of their region, as well as 
Islamic Finance, by adopting a waqf-based strategy for regional 
food security. The waqf structure is a proven and established 
structure in the Middle East, and is well-suited to garner the 
political will, monetary resources, and cooperation necessary to 
effectively advance food security on a multilateral basis at the 
regional level.
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